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Abstract 
 
Using data from 2004 – 2008, we investigate the effect of foreign ownership on banks 
efficiency and financial performance. The data is a balanced panel consisting of 16 banks and 640 
observations. In random effect regression, to investigate the influence of foreign ownership type 
banks’, we use the efficiency measures ROA (return on asset) and ROE (return on equity). 
Appling stochastic frontier analysis, we estimate banks cost efficiency. The efficiency analysis 
reveals that banks with foreign strategic ownership or international financial institutions 
involvement (EBRD or IFC) are more cost efficient than their domestic counterparts. The study 
also found that foreign strategic ownership positively affects the return on equity but negatively 
affects the banks’ return on assets. Investigation of how efficiently foreign majority owned banks 
are using their inputs showed that banks with foreign majority ownership are significantly less 
cost efficient than those with foreign strategic ownership. We find that foreign majority 
ownership has ambiguous effects on financial performance — it increases the return on assets but 
decreases the return on equity. This research highlights the importance for bank performance of a 
large strategic shareholder who takes a controlling interest in the bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL No. G21, G32, G34, L25 
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 4 
Introduction 
 
The entry of foreign investments (institutional and private) into the Georgian banking 
sector is a subject of public interest. The main drive for our research was the fact that despite the 
attitude that foreign investments might have a significant role in the development of the Georgian 
banking system there is no study that explicitly explores the impact of foreign investments in the 
Georgian banking system. This paper investigates the effect of foreign investments on Georgian 
banks’ efficiency using monthly data from December 2004 till March 2008 of 16 leading banks in 
the country; these banks jointly hold 98% of banking sector asset.  
Even though a significant impact from the foreign ownership on the banking sector is 
beyond any doubt, the full significance direction of this effect is unclear. In their previous 
research Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001) and Robert Lensink et. al. (2008) argue that the 
presence of foreign banks or foreign ownership of domestic banks decreases availability of credit 
access to smaller lenders and, moreover, negatively affects the profitability and cost efficiency of 
the banks. 
At the same time, some empirical papers (Weill Laurent (2003), John p. Bonin et. al 
(2005), Stijn Claessens and Harry Huizinga (2001)) show that foreign banks are more efficient 
and more profitable than domestic ones. Also, the authors show that foreign entry may hurt the 
domestic banks. For example: Claessens and Huizinga (2000) used an 80-country sample of 
developing and developed countries between 1988-1995 and found out that domestic banks 
profitability and expenses reduced after foreign banks seemingly put competitive pressure on the 
whole industry. 
Given the ambiguity of the effect foreign capital has on the banking sector, I find it 
important to investigate the phenomenon in Georgia. I will attempt to do so using monthly data 
from 2004 – 2008, which is available from the National Bank of Georgia and the official websites 
of commercial banks operating in Georgia. 
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Background 
The formation of the Georgian banking system began after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, starting from 1991 when an appropriate legal framework and a normative base were built. 
After the privatization in 1992, five state banks3
After 1992 NBG implemented an accessional liberal monetary policy. Additionally, weak 
requirements for licensing commercial banks and administrative norms (the level of minimal 
capital requirement for commercial banks in 1994 was approximately USD 500
 (Eximbank, Savings Bank, Agromretsvbank, 
Mretsvmshenbank and Binsotsbank) started to operate. Simultaneously, the National Bank of 
Georgia (NBG) was established. 
The transformation of the Georgian financial system has occurred under the conditions of 
severe economic and political crisis. In 1991-1994 financial and political destabilization and 
complications in domestic political sphere heavily affected the Georgian economy. 
4) gave incentives 
to register a large number of banking institutions in the country. If in 1991 only 5 state banks 
were operating, by the end of 1993 the number of commercial banks increased to 179 units and in 
1994, there were 226 banks functioning in the country5
                                                 
3 Kovsanadze I., Georgian Commercial Banks Functional Problems today, Tbilisi state university, 2001. 
4 Kovsanadze I., Georgian Commercial Banks Functional Problems today, Tbilisi state university, 2001. 
5 Georgian Banking System Development Strategy for 2006-2009, www.nbg.gov.ge. 
.  What followed was the emergence of 
financial pyramids along with the transitory currency, this lead to the hyperinflation and the 
collapse of the system. In 1995, along with the introduction of the new currency; (Georgian-Lari), 
Georgia launched reform in the banking sector. The reform was based on the recommendation of 
the International Monetary Fund and was implemented with the technical assistance from 
international financial organizations. The objectives of the reform were to raise the level of 
financial stability, improve safety and soundness of the banking system, implement modern bank 
supervision policy and practice, introduce International Accounting Standards, upgrade the 
qualifications of banking personnel and improve the financial sustainability of commercial banks. 
The reform also envisaged the development of a new legislative basis for the banking system. 
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Banking activities in Georgia are regulated by the Law of Georgia on the Activity of 
Commercial Banks adopted in 1996, which defines commercial banking activities, criteria for 
licensing, bank management, prudential standards, etc. The only compulsory legal status of banks 
is a joint stock company. 
Requirements for capital commercial banks are in line with the standards of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and corresponding EU directives. The level of minimum 
capital for the commercial banks is set by the National Bank of Georgia at USD 12 million for 
newly founded commercial banks and branches of the foreign bank. It should be noted that 
Georgia doesn’t impose any restrictions on the outflow of the capital. 
Inflow of foreign capital into Georgian banking system is an important factor for the 
development of the banking sector. Entry of the foreign capital can be considered as involvement 
of advanced technologies and new financial products. Foreign capital can improve the corporate 
management culture in credit organizations, develop lender competition and improve banking 
activities. 
On the other hand, to bring foreign investments to the banking sector of Georgia, it is 
important to improve the quality of corporate management, as well as to guarantee complete and 
effective understanding of the principles of the international standards of the financial accounting. 
Buying a big bank involves huge investments. Furthermore it requires additional 
expenses, which are linked to the reconstruction (financial, technical and administrative) of the 
purchased bank. Foreign bank strategies do not require purchasing large banks; rather they are 
choosing small, but dynamically growing banks, which have the same style, goals and vision as 
the investing bank.  
There are three main problems that foreign investors face during entry into the Georgian 
market: 
First, Georgia has a small market, a small scale economy and limited of financial market 
resources. 
 7 
Second, the Georgian financial market needs support from international financial 
institutions. For example, since “Bank Republic’’ was purchased by “Societe Generale’’, “Bank 
Republic” can easily collaborate and make deals with foreign partners, because it is a member of 
an international banking group. Such type of banks can easily refinance their expenses, with the 
help of the international financial organizations, such as IFC (International Financial Corporation) 
and EBRD. 
Georgian banks, which are operating independently, have difficulty in attracting foreign 
funds and financial institutions; because of the domestic, political and economic risks.   
Third, the Georgian banking system is merging in the world standards more rapidly than 
are other Georgian economic sectors.  From one hand this inequality is a problem but from the 
other hand this is an incentive, because developed banking system can pull up other segments of 
the economy. This is significant process because if other segments of the economy do not 
develop, then the progress of the banking sector will stop at a relatively low level. 
Foreign financial institutions and large banks are still coming, because investing in 
Georgia is strategically justified. Georgia is at the start of a long development process. Banks that 
invest now (before there will be tough competition) might earn high return in near future. Also, 
foreign investors do not consider Georgia as the only country where they can make investments; 
they are looking to forwards establishing themselves in the Caucasus region. 
The Georgian banking sector is represented by 22 banking institutions, out of which 2 are 
subsidiaries of Azerbaijan and Turkish banks. During the recent years, despite the reduction in the 
number of banks, the banking sector dynamically grew and its growth rates significantly 
exceeded the growth rates in the other sectors of the economy. 
As a result of the rapid development of the Georgian banking sector, the interest of foreign 
investors towards Georgian banks significantly increased. Foreign investments are present in the 
12 Georgian commercial banks (Table 2), which comprise 86.9% of total banking sector assets. 
Foreigners have more than 50% capital of these banks’. Non-residents control 73.5% of the 
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overall banking sector assets. For now, the share of the assets owned by the subsidiaries of 2 
foreign banks in the total banking sector assets are less than 1%. It should be stressed that one of 
the resident bank stocks are traded on the London Stock Exchange. Accordingly, foreign 
investors are able to purchase this bank’s stocks in a simple and efficient way. The increase of the 
foreign capital participation in the Georgian banking system would increase the availability of 
new resources and would develop new banking products.  
 
 
 
Literature Review  
 
Banks by establishing subsidiaries and branches or buying established foreign banks 
expand their operations internationally. The presence of foreign banks and investors in domestic 
markets raises two issues:  
1. The effect of this presence on domestic banking systems;  
2.  The competitive inequalities and differences in performance between foreign and 
domestic banks6
We can argue that by allowing foreign banks and investors to enter the domestic market 
generally stress a number of economic benefits: transfer of know-how, especially knowledge of 
bank management, risk management, information systems and enhance a country’s access to 
international capital markets which can stimulate economic growth. Giannetti and Ongena (2005), 
based on 60,000 firm-year observations, found that foreign bank existence in a home market may 
improve accessibility to credit for creditworthy firms. Using data 3,000 firms operating in 35 
countries (transition and developing), George et al (2006), based on standard maximum 
likelihood estimation, found that enterprises face low financing barriers in countries where there 
. 
                                                 
6 Ali Awdeh. "Domestic banks’ and foreign banks’ profitability: Difference and their determinants" 
http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/conferences/emg_finance/Papers/Awdeh.pdf (2005) 
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is a high presence of foreign banks. De Haas and Naaborg (2005), based on the interviews with 
managers of foreign parent banks, show that in Eastern Europe, foreign bank entry increases 
competition and improves lending technologies, which cause an increase in the lending portfolio 
to small and medium-sized enterprises and retail markets. Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001) 
argue that increased foreign investment in a developing country’s banking system might reduce 
access to credit, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMSs), as foreign banks 
find it more difficult to lend money to less transparent SMSs enterprises. In the same study the 
authors argue that foreign banks allocate greater share of their lending portfolios to commercial 
and industrial loans, thus neglecting consumer credit.  
There are many studies about foreign bank efficiency, compared to domestic banks. These 
studies are divided into two categories: studies, which are focused on, developed markets and 
studies focused on transition or developing economies. 
The studies on developed countries found out that foreign banks have less or the same 
efficiency as domestic banks. For example, De Young and Nolle (1996) showed that there is only 
a small difference in output efficiency between foreign and domestic. Stijn Claessens and Harry 
Huizinga (2001) showed that foreign banks in developed countries have lower interest margins, 
profitability and overhead expenses than domestic banks, but the opposite is true about 
developing countries. The comparative efficiency between foreign and domestic ownership is 
given in Table 1. The table shows that domestic banks have lower efficiency than foreign owned 
banks in transition and developing countries. 
Appling stochastic frontier analyses of 225 banks from 1996 to 2000 of countries in 
transition, totally 11 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, 
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), John P. Bonin et al (2005) found out that foreign owned 
banks are more cost efficient and provide better services than other banks. Laurent Weill (2003) 
by using a stochastic cost frontier methodology for the Czech Republic and Poland (45 
commercial bank), shows that foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic owned ones.  
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On contrary to these findings, using the same estimation method for 105 countries and 2095 
commercial banks, Robert Lensink et al. (2008) found out, alternatively that bank efficiency is 
negatively affected by the foreign ownership and this negative effect is less prominent in 
countries with good institutional control.  
Table 1 
Authors Country Period Technique Findings 
DeYoung and 
Nolle (1996) 
US 1985 - 1990 DFA  In US Foreign owned banks are less profit efficient than domestic owned banks  
Bhattacharya 
et al. (1997) 
India 
1986 -1991 
DEA Government owned banks are more efficient 
than foreign and privately owned banks. Also, 
foreign owned banks are more efficient than 
privately-owned domestic banks 
Isik and 
Hassan (2002) 
Turkey 1988,1992, 
and 1996 
 Foreign banks seem to be significantly more 
efficient than domestic one 
Jemric and 
Vujcic (2002) 
Croatia 1995 -2000 DEA Domestic banks are significantly less efficient than foreign banks 
Miller and 
Parkhe (2002) 
12 EU countries Arg., 
UK, Switz., 
Australia, US, Japan, 
Canada, 
Chile, India 
1989 - 1996 
SFA US-owned banks in bank-oriented financial 
systems are more X-efficient than other foreign 
owned banks, but less X efficient in capital-
market oriented systems 
Nikiel and 
Opiela (2002) 
Poland 1997 - 2000 DFA Foreign banks are less profit efficient and more cost efficient than other banks 
Hasan and 
Marton (2003) 
Hungary 1993 - 1997 SFA Foreign banks and banks with higher foreign ownership involvement are less inefficient 
Weill (2003) Czech Republic and 
Poland 1997 
SFA Foreign banks are more cost efficient than 
domestic banks.  
Matousek and 
Taci (2004) 
Czech Republic 
1993 - 1998 
DFA Foreign banks are more cost efficient than other 
banks (including  early years  operated good 
small banks) 
Bonin et al. 
(2005) 
11 European transition 
nations 1996 - 2000 
SFA Foreign ownership positively affect on banks 
efficiency and they are more cost-efficient than 
domestic banks 
Fries and 
Taci (2005) 
15 European transition 
nations 1994 -2001 
SFA Banks with foreign majority ownership are more 
efficient than domestic owned one 
Havrylchyk 
(2006) 
Poland 1997 - 2001 DEA Foreign banks are more efficient than domestic-owned banks 
Lensink et al. 
(2008) 
105 countries 1998 -2003 SFA Foreign ownership negatively affects on banks efficiency 
 
Depending on policy decisions about the liberalization of bank entry, government gives 
incentives to foreign banks to enter through FDI, an acquirement or by founding a new foreign 
bank. However, according to Martinez Peria and Mody (2004), new foreign banks are more 
profitable and efficient than foreign acquired banks. Lensink and Hermes (2004) claim that 
motivation of domestic banks to improve diversification, financial service quality and efficiency 
for keeping market share is caused by the entry of foreign banks. 
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Foreign banks entry may also cause financial instability. According to Iwon Song (2004) 
financial instability could occur if foreign banks for risk management purposes suddenly shift 
money from one market to another. For example: Japanese banks have decreased their loan 
portfolio in the United States, which was caused by Japanese recession and asset markets’ 
collapse in the early 1990’s (Peek and Rosengreen, 1997). So foreign banks may increase lending 
activities, despite problems in the local economy or they may decrease lending, due to the 
difficulty in their home country, even if the local economy is continuing to develop. If the home 
country receives FDI from foreign banks located in one or more countries where businesses are 
deeply linked, then the home country may face difficulties because of the deviation in the 
investing countries. 
Why do foreign banks and investors enter in the domestic market? Several reasons have 
been suggested in the literature by, Clarke and Cull (2001),Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000),Kraft 
(2002), Claessens and Huizinga (2001). As pointed out by Clarke, if the degree of economic 
integration among countries is strong, then market opportunities, entry restrictions and other 
regulations affect entry of a foreign bank. The determinants of foreign bank entry and activity 
levels in Italy were studied by Magri et al (2005). He found out that economic integration, interest 
spread and profit opportunities have significant positive effects on foreign banks decision to enter 
Italy. 
Also, the high interest margins were the strongest reasons for the foreign banks and 
investors to enter Croatia (Kraft 2002). 
The major reason for the entry of the foreign bank in a country is that the bank follows its 
customers abroad to support its already existing relationships in a new country7
Host country regulations also can drive foreign banks entry in a country. Clarke and Cull 
(2001) noted that the level of economic reforms and political freedom could be an important 
. Claessens and 
Huizinga note that profitable opportunities in host countries drive foreign banks to enter. 
                                                 
7 Lensink, Robert, and Jakob De Haan. "Do Reforms in Transition Economies Affect Foreign Banks Entry?" International Review of Finance, 
3:3/4, 2002: pp 213-232. 
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consideration for foreign banks to enter Post-Soviet states. Foccarelli and Pozzola (2000) showed 
that countries that have few restrictions in regulations are attractive for foreign banks. 
The studies cited below: Giannetti and Ongena (2005), George R. G. et. al (2006), De 
Haas and Naaborg (2005), Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria (2001),De Young and Nolle (1996), 
Stijn Claessens and Harry, Huizinga (2001), John P. Bonin el. al (2005), Laurent Weill (2003), 
Lensink and Hermes (2004), Robert Lensink et. al. (2008) and others show that entry of foreign 
banks reduces or increases barriers of availability of credit for SMSs, also foreign ownership has 
positive or negative effects on its own banks and domestic ones. 
In our study we are going to investigate the performance of the domestic banks as well as 
the foreign owned ones. Also, we will examine the effects of the foreign ownership on the foreign 
and domestic banks. 
John P. Bonin et al. (2005) distinguished strategic foreign owners (single owners holding 
shares) from foreign majority owners (having no controlling stake). The distinction is crucial, 
because a bank having a strategic foreign owner could be more cost efficient and could provide 
better services than other banks do.  
 
 
 
 
 
The data and the ownership typology 
 
 
I use consolidated monthly data from December 2004 till March 2008. The data was taken 
from National Bank of Georgia (NBG) and the official websites of the leading commercial banks 
in Georgia. The sample includes 16 commercial banks (5 domestic owned and 11 foreign owned) 
- total of 640 observations of which I have financial information and ownership structure8
                                                 
8  We use 16 banks instead of 22, because from other 6 banks 5 of them are new one and do not have even half year experience (HSBC Bank –
Georgia, Progress Bank, Kor Bank Georgia, Galt&Taggart Bank JCS, JCS Halyk Bank Georgia). What about International bank of Azerbaijan – 
. The 
detailed description is given in the Appendix (Table 3). 
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Following the theory of John P. Bonin et al. (2005), I have separated ownership into three 
categories: foreign, majority foreign and domestic ownership. In foreign ownership I mean 
strategic owner, which is either a single foreign majority owner or controlling stake owner. The 
banks, in which foreigners hold more than 50% of shares, are included in the other group of 
ownership i.e. majority foreign owner.  
The bank observation in the percentage for three ownership categories shows that 
approximately 44% of observations in the sample represent banks with foreign owner. Also, 25% 
of observations are match to banks with foreign majority owner. In addition, 31% of the 
observation corresponds to the banks with domestic owner and 13% represents the banks having 
an international institutional investor. 
Table  4         
Descriptive Statistics            
  Overall Sample (640)   Mean by ownership category Mean for 
International 
participation (80) 
  
Mean Standard Deviation  
Foreign 
owner* (180) 
Foreign majority 
owner** (160) 
Domestic 
owner (200) 
Return on assets 0.042 0.033  0.042 0.036 0.043 0.033  
Return on equity 0.153 0.125  0.148 0.163 0.147 0.217  
Net interest margin 0.07 0.069  0.069 0.066 0.074 0.057  
Loan to asset ratio 0.569 0.212  0.51 0.613 0.616 0.624  
Borrowing to asset ratio 0.122 0.145  0.094 0.157 0.133 0.128  
Deposit to asset ratio 0.456 0.229  0.397 0.535 0.477 0.678  
Equity to asset ratio 0.392 0.283  0.482 0.273 0.361 0.154  
Provision of doubtful loans 
to gross loan ratio 0.059 0.103  0.062 0.047 0.063 0.061  
Noninterest expenditure to 
asset ratio 0.056 0.107  0.064 0.046 0.053 0.037  
Total assets (000s GEL) 246,006.116 408,907.852  166,122.614 543,518.169 119,833.378 635,814.387  
*   Single foreign majority owner or single controlling owner       
**  Foreign owners together hold more than 50% of the shares and no one has controlling shares   
 
Foreign and domestic banks as general have organizational and structural difference. 
Therefore, they may differ by cost structure, scale and scope economies. Foreign and domestic 
banks differ, because of difference of the market they operate and different management 
strategies. Also, they have different information about local market (as usually, domestic banks 
                                                                                                                                                              
Georgia JCS, it serves only local Azeri firms and does not give loans and takes deposits and if he does it, it is significantly low amount compare 
to smallest bank in Georgia. 
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are more knowledgeable in local market structure, than foreign banks), international experience 
and regulations. 
Other balance sheet characteristics with respect to assets are given in Table 4. The loans 
are 56.9%, borrowings are 12.2%, deposits are 45.6%, equity is 39.2% and non-interest 
expenditure is 5.6%. The average net interest margin is 7% with variation coefficient less than 
one. Finally, provision of doubtful loans to gross loan ratio is 5.9%.  The standard measure of 
financial performance ROA – 4.2% and ROE – 15.3% are characterized by less variability than 
other balance sheet components. 
 
 
 
 
 
Return on equity model 
 
 
To measure bank performance, we are using a “return on equity model” (Ali Awdeh 2005 
and John P. Bonin et al. 2005). Return on equity (ROE) measures the rate of return to banks’ 
shareholders, or the benefit that the shareholders receive after investing their capital in the bank. 
In other words ROE measures the profit per USD/GEL, which is received on book equity capital. 
So, ROE = Net  IncomeAverage  Book  Value  of  Equity                 (1) 
another indicator of managerial efficiency is (ROA
The general equation that should explain ROE and ROA looks as follows     
), which shows how the company’s 
management converts their institutional and/or private sector assets into earnings. ROA = Net  IncomeAverage  Book  Value  of  Assets            (2) 
Y = aX + bZ + u        (3)                   
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where Y is dependent variable, X and Z are vectors of internal and external variables and u is the 
error term. The internal variable depends on managerial decisions and external one depends on 
the area where the bank operates.  
Taking into consideration the explanatory variables, for foreign ownership, as mentioned 
above, “foreign bank” is a bank with more than 50% of its equity under foreign control. As a 
result, this will take subsidiaries of foreign banks and domestic banks under foreign control. 
According to John P. Bonin et al. (2005) we have proxy dummies for ownership type (foreign 
strategic owner, majority foreign owner, domestic owner). As an explanatory variable we use 
different financial outputs and inputs: total assets to capture scale and scope economies, ratio of 
total loans to total assets, deposit growth - which represents the growth opportunities. In order to 
control the effect of reserve requirements on banks’ profitability we are using the ration of liquid 
assets to total assets. In general, when we think about efficiency of bank management, we are 
looking at the cost to income ratio and cost to asset ratio. For controlling how credit risk affects 
bank profitability we are using the provisions for doubtful loans to gross loan ratio. To measure 
the market power of a bank, it is useful to include the net interest margin as an explanatory 
variable. Also, we add equity to asset ratio to detect the effect of capital requirements on banks 
financial performance and inflation as an explanatory variable. 
The data, which we are going to investigate, is balanced panel data. To estimate panel data 
there are three methods: first difference, fixed effect and random effect. Comparing first 
difference to fixed effect, latest estimator is efficient when the errors (idiosyncratic) are not 
serially correlated and don’t have heteroskedasticity. Using fixed effect there is no requirement to 
make assumption about correlation between unobserved effect αi and explanatory variables 
because time-constant variables drop out from the analyses.  
The random effect is efficient when there is an assumption, that αi is uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables. Thus, unobserved effect can be included in the error term, and if during the 
estimation there will be serial correlation and heteroskedasticity then it can be corrected by using 
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GLS estimation. After performing the Hausman test the null hypothesis was rejected9, therefore 
for the estimations of the bank’s financial performances (ROA and ROE) we are using fixed 
effect technique10
We tested auto correlation and heteroskedasticity, they were detected
. 
11 during estimation 
of ROA and only heteroskedasticity12
The effect of ownership on banks performance in Georgia 
 was obtained under estimation of ROE. Also, we checked 
whether there was a collinearity problem with explanatory variables, which eventually was not 
detected. One of the major problems in econometrics is an endogeneity. Endogeneity occurs when 
the independent variable is correlated with the error term in a regression model and leads to 
biased and inconsistent estimation. We tested for endogeneity in our model and it was not 
detected. Thus, as we have auto correlation and heteroskedsticity we can correct them using 
feasible GLS (FGLS) method in Fixed effect estimation.  
 
 
 
 
This section will introduce the effects of foreign ownership on banks’ financial 
performance by using ROA, ROE and efficient measurements. The Table 4 shows that on average 
the banks from each group are foreign majority owned banks that are three times larger than 
foreign and domestic owned ones. What’s more, domestic owned banks are relatively smaller 
than foreign owned banks. In the latter category, the large size is caused by two big banks, in 
which international financial institutions are represented (Table 3). 
The differences between financial performances and bank characteristics by ownership 
typology can be observed on Table 4. Looking at the ratios and the assets, bank borrowing is 
                                                 
9   Hausman test suggested using fixed effect estimation on 5% significance level 
10    For more detiled information please see Wooldridge J.M. “Introductory Econometrics, A modern Approach” third edition. (2006), pg. 485-
501. 
11  Under estimation ROA, auto correlation and heteroskedasticity was detected respectively on 5% and 1% significance level 
12 Testing Heteroskedasticity under estimation ROE, the null hypothec was rejected on 1% significance level   
 17 
higher for the foreign majority owned banks than for others. Contradictionaly, on average, foreign 
majority and domestic owned banks are gathering and lending more deposits and loans relative to 
assets than foreign owned banks. Concerning equity, foreign and domestic owned banks have 
high average equity to asset ratio than foreign majority owned banks and banks with international 
institutional investor. Our research has come up with a major finding: foreign and domestic 
owned banks bear the same risk factors (coefficients) and its average risk measurement is about 
2% higher than foreign majority owned banks. Finally, non-interest expenditure for all foreign 
owned banks is higher than other groups of ownership typology. 
Looking at banks performance measures, foreign owned banks have an average ROA 
approximately 1.2 times larger than foreign majority ones. Also, banks with international 
participation have smaller return on asset than domestic owned banks. Regarding the ROE, 
foreign majority owned banks have on average higher ROE than foreign owned and domestic 
owned banks. Banks in which international financial institutions are represented have on average 
ROE about 1.5 as high as other ownership categories. Finally, on average net interest margin is 
higher for domestic owned banks than foreign banks. This means that due to the low average 
interest margin of foreign banks domestic banks supposedly will reduce their interest margin in 
near future. 
If we return to our empirical estimations, from Table 5 and 6 we can observe that banks’ 
size has negative effect on ROA and positive effect on ROE (see Table 5 and Table 6). The 
negative sign of size for ROA can be explained by equation (2). However, if we look from 
shareholders’ perspective, then it appears that ‘positive sign on size is logical’ because the larger 
the banks is the higher the return on equity becomes. We found out that loan to asset ratio and net 
interest margin positively affect on ROA and ROE. Positive but not significant sign on risk (Loan 
loss reserve/Gross loans) variable confirm the fact, that the more risky you are the more return 
you will get from your activities. The effect of capitalization on the banks’ financial performance 
is different and significant; so any increase in equity negatively effects on ROE and positively on 
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ROA. Negative sign of inflation shows that high inflation level deteriorates banks’ financial 
performance.  
Table 5 Table 6  
Estimation  results for the ROA (method: FGLS)  
Number of obs. 640  
Estimation  results for the ROE (method: FGLS) 
Number of obs. 640 
Dependent variable  ROA   
 
Dependent variable  ROE   
Intercept  0.031 Intercept  -0.04 
 (1.61)  (-0.64) 
Total Assets -0.0015 Total Assets 0.006 
 (-1.8)*  (2.05)** 
Deposit Growth 0.001 Deposit Growth -0.0006 
 (1.4)  (-0.22) 
Total Loans/Total Assets  0.021 Total Loans/Total Assets  0.093 
 (3.22)***  (6.35)*** 
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 0.003 Liquid Assets/Total Assets 0.045 
 0.42  (2.45)** 
Loan loss reserve/Gross loans 0.003 Loan loss reserve/Gross loans 0.02 
 (0.97)  (0.97) 
Net Interest Margine 0.046 Net Interest Margine 0.309 
 (5.92)***  (9.01)*** 
Total Cot/Total Income -0.027 Total Cot/Total Income -0.069 
 (-10.25)***  (-7.46)*** 
Total Cost/Total Assets 0.632 Total Cost/Total Assets 2.101 
 (37.46)***  (23.14)*** 
Equity/Total Assets 0.033 Equity/Total Assets -0.149 
 (6.01)***  (-8.37)*** 
Inflation -0.0002 Inflation -0.001 
 (-1.17)  (-1.06) 
Foreign strategic owner -0.003 Foreign strategic owner 0.034 
 (-1.69)*  (5.12)*** 
Foreign majority owner 0.0004 Foreign majority owner -0.004 
 (0.21)  (-0.78) 
IFI -0.001 IFI -0.014 
 (-0.98)  (-1.15) 
Wald Chi2(13) = 2578.05 Wald Chi2(13) = 1829.5  
*     Significant at  0.1  level      
**   Significant at  0.05 level   
*** Significant at  0.01 level   
 
The most contradictory finding from our return on equity model is that foreign strategic 
ownership and foreign majority ownership differently and considerably effect on banks financial 
measurement – ROA (Table 5). We were expecting such result, because some of the banks 
included in foreign ownership category are continuing their progress, but at the same time there is 
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no significant movement13 in other banks activities. So, overall effect is negative14
 
. Having the 
foreign majority owner (Table 6) leads to another problem, as  several owners call forth average 
book value of equity to be higher. So, from equation (1) we can see that increase in average book 
value of equity decreases ROE. On contrary to this finding, the strategic ownership positively and 
significantly effects on ROE. 
We can consider three possibilities that might drive international investment funds 
(EBRD, IFC) to take ownership stakes in banks in transition economy. First strategy could be 
their decisions based mainly on financial consideration – to look for the best performed banks and 
follow high performance rather than trying to make banks more progressive. On the other hand, 
international financial institutions are involved in transferring technology and know-how to 
banks. In addition, the participation in ownership of high profile international institutions (or 
investment funds) may give quality signal that will cause attraction of the better clients and 
accession to cheaper funds. In Georgia international investment funds are giving cheap sources to 
banks and require that these sources be allocated in less efficient (profitable) and developed 
economy sectors. Thus, as invested money (that comes from cheap sources) is allocated in an 
inefficient way, it causes negative and insignificant effect of international investment funds 
involvement on ROA and ROE. Our findings show that participation of the international 
institutional investors negatively effects on banks financial performance under certain 
circumstances that are given above. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 A bank is defined a not very active when bank do not receives deposits and do not provide active advertising campaign for receiving deposits 
and giving loans.  
14  We have checked for the effects of foreign ownership on banks that have radically changed their strategies, services and activities and 
estimation showed that foreign strategic ownership positively affects the banks’ financial performance, ROA. (these estimated  results are not 
provided in this paper, but can be presented if it will be requested) 
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Frontier efficiency approach 
 
It is obvious that under tough competition, companies (banks) have small profit margins 
and returns. Friest S. and Taci A. (2002) argue that in transition countries where the banking 
sector is less developed, general financial measures are often higher. Also, in case of Georgia, 
small banks have higher financial performance measures than big banks. Therefore, in addition to 
the return on equity model, we are using frontier efficiency approach to measure banks efficiency 
performance.  
The use of efficiency frontier analysis is related to several methodological problems. As 
there are different techniques to measure efficiency scores (linear programming and 
econometrics), each technique may produce diverse results. Different analysis yields different 
results. Using the data of European banks/countries, Resti (1997) showed that there is high rank-
order correlation between the parameters estimated by stochastic frontier analyses (SFA) and data 
envelopment analyses (DEA However, while using both approaches, as well as the distribution-
free approach (DFA) for five European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland), 
Weill (2003) concluded that the estimated parameters are not correlated. Thus, choosing just one 
technique may influence the efficiency results.  
Stochastic frontier analysis and distribution free approach are based on econometric tools, 
while data envelopment analysis uses linear programming. The main difference between the 
methods sited above is in decomposition of the residual between inefficiency term and random 
disturbance. The advantage of SFA is that it allows for random error, which cause improvement 
in estimation of efficiency scores. SFA has distributional assumptions on separate terms of 
residual, while DFA relies on intuitive assumptions. DEA overestimates efficiency by assuming 
that the residual is an inefficient term. Specifying functional form can be considered as 
disadvantage of parametric technique, because functional form may not fit in the data. An 
alternative to the parametric stochastic frontier is the deterministic nonparametric approach where 
no specific parametric assumptions are made on the model. In these nonparametric approaches 
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the statistical properties rely on assumption, where no noise term is allowed15
In the presence of cross-sectional data Byeong U. Park et al (2008) for the context of 
truncated regression that does not require parametric assumptions, proposed a fairly flexible 
estimator and showed that estimator performs as well as the fully parametric estimator when the 
assumptions for the latter hold, but performs much better when they do not
. But, this 
assumption is too strict in many practical situations where we might expect random shock, 
measurement error, etc.  
16
The cost efficiency model 
.  
We use the Battese and Coelli (1995) SFA model. The first advantage of this model is that 
it can be estimated for an unbalanced panel, which increases the amount of observations. A 
second advantage of Battese and Coelli (1995) model is that it estimates the coefficients of the 
efficiency variables and the cost frontier simultaneously. Wang and Schmidt (2002) show that a 
two step approach suffers from the assumption that the efficiency term is independent and 
identically half normal distributed in the first step, while in the second step the efficiency terms 
are assumed to be normally distributed and dependent on the explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
 
This model allows us to estimate minimum cost frontier for banks or to state in other 
words, how efficiently banks are using their inputs to produce outputs (profits, services, 
investments and other activities). Stochastic frontier analysis is widely used to measure firms 
efficient performance. This method, with general cost function estimates the minimum cost 
frontier for entire sample. So, the efficiency can be measured by distance from the estimated 
frontier. 
                                                 
15  For further discussion please see Deprins D, Simar L, Tulkens H, (1984)  
16  Park BU, Simar L, Zelenyuk V (2008) local likelihood estimation of the truncated regression and its derivatives: theory and application. 
Journal of Econometrics 146(1):185-198 
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Suppose in a year t ith banks total cost function is  
TCit = f (Yit, Xit) + εit +uit     (4) 
Where Y and X are banks outputs and price of inputs. The error term contains two components, 
one is assumed to have non-negative distribution and the second is assumed to have symmetric 
distribution. The non-negative component uit represents the technical inefficiency effect, which 
causes the bank to operate above the cost frontier. The component with symmetric distribution - 
εit represents an idiosyncratic error term. So, εit may increase or decrease cost from the 
benchmark. Hence, the frontier itself is stochastic and distance from best practice is represented 
by inefficiency term uit.  In efficiency literature εit is independently identically distributed with 
mean 0 and variance equal to σε2 i.e N(0, σε2). The uit is independently but not identically 
distributed according to a truncated normal distribution17
Output Y includes total interest bearing funds, total loans, total fixed assets and non-
interest income. Price of inputs (X) combines price of capital and price of fund. Price of fund is 
.  
As is common in the efficiency literature, we use translog specification of all variables in 
(4) equation with homogeneity and standard symmetry assumptions. We estimate the following 
translog function  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚2
𝑚𝑚=1
4
𝐿𝐿=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝛾𝛾ℎ2ℎ=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸ℎ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 12��𝜓𝜓𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛4
𝑛𝑛=1
4
𝐿𝐿=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑛𝑛 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 12 � �𝜔𝜔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚=12𝑚𝑚=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 12 ��𝜆𝜆ℎ𝑠𝑠2
𝑠𝑠=1
2
ℎ=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸ℎ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � � 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚=14𝐿𝐿=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ ��𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿ℎ2
ℎ=1
4
𝐿𝐿=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝐿𝐿 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸ℎ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � �𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚ℎ2ℎ=12𝑚𝑚=1 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸ℎ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ ε 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + uit       (5) 
                                                 
17  Coelli T.J. "A Guide to FRONTIER Version 4.1: A Computer Program for Stochastic Frontier Production and Cost Function Estimation" 
Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis (CEPA) Working Papers, N 7/96 
 23 
defined as a ratio of banks interest expenses to total interest bearing funds (sum of deposits and 
other interest bearing funds). Price of capital is defined as non-interest expenses to total fixed 
assets ratio. Also, for controlling risk performance, ability to absorb loses and loan quality we 
used as an explanatory variable (E), that includes the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans 
and equity capital.  
In order to guarantee linear homogeneity we scaled cost and one input price by price of 
labour. This scaling implies that sum of the estimated coefficients for the price of funds and price 
of labour is equal to one18. At the same time, in order to control heteroscadasticity and adjust for 
scale bias, we scaled cost, output variables and equity capital by the loan loss provision to gross 
loans19
Hence we use logarithm function, the efficiency effect will be exp (-uit). The efficiency is 
always no-negative and  when it’s equal to 1 we have best efficient result and when it’s equal to 
. We checked whether scaling gives possibility to avoid hetereskedasticity problem in this 
model; null hypothesis wasn’t rejected on 5% significance level.  
The technical inefficiency effect,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , from the stochastic frontier model (5) could be 
specified in equation (6) 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = δZ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + Wit          (6) 
where, Wit  has a truncated normal distribution with N(δZ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , σu2). The point of truncation is 
−δZ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  i.e.,  Wit  ≥ δZ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  > 0. Therefore, the truncation of inefficiency term depends on 
banks specific characteristics, so that 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  > 0. This specific characteristics are associated with 
banks ownership structure (foreign owner, foreign majority owner and domestic owner), their 
market power and risk management. Battese and Coelli defined uit as uit=exp (-η (t-T))ui where 
eta (η) parameter is the parameter that determines whether inefficiency is time varying or time 
invariant. If eta (η) is significantly different from zero we have time varying inefficiency and if 
not then it’s indicates time invariant inefficiency. Also, when η>0 the degree of inefficiency 
decreases over time and when η<0, the degree of inefficiency increases over time.  
                                                 
18  Kuenzle, M., “Cost Efficiency in Network Industries: Application of Stochastic Frontier Analysis”. Universität Zűrich,  2005 
19 . Altunbas Y., Ming-Hua, L., Molyneux, P., Seth R., “Efficiency and risk in Japanese banking”. Journal of Banking and Finance 24, (2000): 
1605-1628 
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zero we have inefficiency. So, stochastic frontier analysis measures efficiency relative to frontier 
of cost function. However, from estimation of cost function only the composite error term 
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ε 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + uit  can be observed. But, we are interested in estimation of inefficiency term to 
calculate efficiency of each bank. So, we are using method of Jondrow et al., (1982) to separate 
the inefficiency component from the composite error and calculate the conditional expectation of  uit   given 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ε 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + uit   as  a best predictor of uit   for each bank.  
To estimate the stochastic efficiency frontier, measurements of bank inefficiency and 
correlates of bank inefficiencies given by Equations (5) and (6), we use the Frontier econometric 
program developed by Coelli (1999) as incorporated in STATA 10 software. 
The SFA can be applied either in a set of annual cross-section estimations or in a single 
panel estimation. The estimation of panel data allows for the estimated coefficients of the cost 
function to vary over time (variation that can be caused by changes maid in organizations and 
technologies and developments in the broader economic environment). However, using a set of 
annual cross-section estimations rather than single panel, estimation sacrifices efficiency because 
of reduced degrees of freedom and makes the coefficients of a cost function relatively more 
sensitive to sample outliers in each year20
 
. Therefore, we provide report only on the results from 
the estimations based on panel data. 
 
 
The effects of foreign ownership on banks cost efficiency in Georgia 
 
Stochastic frontier approach reports some parameters of the estimated frontiers of standard 
deviation of the inefficiency component (σu), disturbance of the random component (σν), standard 
                                                 
20  Fries S., Taci A. “Cost efficiency of banks in transition: Evidence from 289 banks in 15 post-communist countries”. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 29, (2005): 55–81. 
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deviation of the composite disturbance (σ) and variance parameter γ21. In order to check whether 
we need stochastic frontier estimation, we can refer directly to the value of gamma and determine 
whether it is significantly different from zero. The estimate for the variance parameter, γ, is close 
to one (0.8752), which shows that the inefficiency effects are likely to be highly significant in the 
analysis of the value of cost of banks22. Generalized likelihood ratio test showed that null 
hypotheses (inefficiency effects are absent from the model) is rejected on 1% significance level. 
In addition, we test whether inefficiency effects are not stochastic (H0: γ=0) and it is also rejected 
on 1% significance level. Estimated parameter η is significantly different from zero (η>0), so 
inefficiency decreases over time.  
Table 7.   Inefficiency score1     
Groups and years 
Cost Inefficiency 
Mean Standard deviation 
2004 21.05 6.65 
2005 20.9 6.41 
2006 20.62 6.33 
2007 20.35 6.25 
2008 20.18 6.24 
Combined 2004-2008 20.6 6.32 
      
Foreign strategic owner2 17.74 7.84 
Foreign majority owner3 22.39 4.75 
International Financial Institutions involvement 18.31 0.33 
Domestic owner4 22.05 4.52 
      
Foreign involvement      
75.01-100%  22.56 4.14 
50.01-75%  20.15 2.44 
0.01-25%  21.5 0.27 
Branches 11.16 9.49 
Domestic 22.48 5.66 
1. Inefficiency score are calculated by using stochastic frontier estimation and deviations from 
banks cost frontier are represented by reported scores. Yearly estimates are simply average for 
the year from the panel data estimation. Foreign involvement numbers are also average of 
respective groups taken from the sample. 
2. Single foreign majority owner or single controlling owner (more then 51%)                                                                
3.  Foreign owners together hold more than 50% of the shares and no one has  controlling shares 
4.in this subgroup foreign involvement is less than 25% 
 
                                                 
21   σ =       
22  Battese, G.E., Coelli, T., J., “A model for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier production function for panel data”. Empirical 
Econometrics 20, (1995): 325-332. 
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Descriptive statistics for the estimated inefficiency are presented in Table 7. Overall, 
average estimate indicates that cost inefficiency is 20.6%.  
Therefore, an average bank should improve its cost category respectively by 20.6% to 
match its performance with the best practised bank. Georgian-owned banks (institutions with no 
foreign involvemen) reported higher inefficiency (22.05) than foreign strategic owned (17.74) and 
less in efficiency than foreign majority owned (22.39) banks. As we can see from Table 7, banks 
with international financial institutions involvement are least inefficient than domestic and 
foreign owned banks (strategic/majority). 
We also have investigated foreign institute efficiency performance based on the extent of 
foreign involvement. The results indicate that the higher the foreign involvement in bank 
ownership the lower the efficiency is. Banks with at least 75% foreign involvement were the most 
inefficient group, with a cost inefficiency score of 22.56%. Banks with 50-75% (inefficiency 
score of 20.15) and 0.01-25% (inefficiency score – 21.5) displayed lower inefficiency scores than 
the domestic banks (inefficiency score of 22.48). Branches of the foreign banks showed the least 
inefficiency score (11.16) than the other subgroup categories.  
Observing the inefficiency trend over the sample years, we notice an improvement in 
efficiency (indicated decreasing trend in inefficiency). The average cost inefficiency score was 
21.05 in 2004 and this score declined over the years with the lowest score of 20.18 reported in 
2008. The overall evidence is that an increase in foreign ownership in the banking markets was 
associated with improved cost efficiency of banks. However, enhancement of a country’s political 
stability in economic development should not be neglected, because this is the factor that might 
have contributed to the improvement of the banking environment that could lead to the substantial 
advancement of the banking sector. 
Once we have attained the cost inefficiency scores, we can calculate efficiency for each 
bank using exp (-inefficiency score) formula and employ a series of estimates to investigate 
possible correlation between efficiency score, bank level variables and ownership categories. 
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Mostly, we are interested in seeing whether the foreign strategic, majority ownership and 
international financial institutions’ involvement significantly affects efficiency scores.  
We estimate OLS regression to see the correlation between dependent and explanatory 
variables: 
EFi = β0 + β1LOANi + β2LIQASSETi + β3LNASSETi +β4EQUITYi + β5LLRGLi + β6BORLi 
+β7DAi+ β8DGRi + β9NIMi + β10PFi + β11ForeignOwneri + β12ForeignMajowneri 
+β13IFIi + ei 
where EFi is the cost efficiency score, dependent variable LOAN is the total loan to total assets 
ratio; LIQASSET is the liquid assets to total asset; LNASSET is the logarithm of assets; EQUITY is 
the equity to total assets; LLRGL is the provision of doubtful loans to total loans; BORL is 
borrowed (borrowing from international financial institutions and foreign banks) funds to total 
loan; DA is the deposit to assets; DGR is deposit growth (in percentage); NIM is net interest 
margin; PF is the price of the fund (total interest expenses to total interest bearing funds ratio); 
“ForeignOwner” and “ForeignMajowner” respectively are ownership dummy variables and IFI is 
dummy for international financial institutions involvement. All the explanatory variables are 
related to the business experience, management decisions, foreign participation and current 
portfolio structure of each bank.  
Results are shown in Table 8. Concentration of assets in loans positively and significantly 
affects cost efficiency. In relation to cost efficiency, liquid assets were found to be reducing 
inefficiency significantly. As usually, higher non-performing loan reduces cost efficiency. 
Likewise, lower cost efficiency increases non-performing loans. This idea is also support the 
hypothesis of bad management, that poor management in the banking institutions results in bad 
quality loans and therefore, escalates the level of non-performing loans. In our case positive sign 
of provision of doubtful loans to total loans ratio indicates that on average banks are allocating 
their financial resources (deliver loans) efficiently and this result emphasize the good 
management skills.  Positive but insignificant correlation of equity to total asset ratio showed that, 
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banks with relatively high earning assets are more likely to be associated with the increase in 
efficiency than others.  
Table 8  
Estimation results for the Cost efficiency (EF) 
Dependent variable  EF 
  
Intercept  0.343 
 (4.67)*** 
Total Loans/Total Assets  0.05 
 (3.15)*** 
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 0.255 
 (12.84)*** 
Log of Assets 0.024 
 (10.48)*** 
Equity/Total Assets 0.028 
 (0.54) 
Provision of Doubtful 
Loans/Total Loans 
0.024 
(1.49) 
  
Borrowing/Total Loans -0.024 
 (-0.69) 
Deposit/Total Assets -0.147 
 (-2.67)*** 
Deposit Grows -0.004 
 (-1.65)* 
Net Interest Margin 0.002 
 (0.08) 
Interest Expenses /Interest 
Bearing Funds  
-0.259 
(-2.1)** 
  
Foreign Strategic Owner 0.013 
 (3.07)*** 
Foreign Majority Owner -0.023 
 (-5.23)*** 
IFI 0.008 
 (1.11) 
 
R2 = 0.453 
Adjusted R2 = 0.44 
Number of obs. 611  
  
*     Significant at  0.1  level  
**   Significant at  0.05 level  
*** Significant at  0.01 level  
 
Proxy of firm size and logarithm of asset, are positively and significantly correlated with 
cost efficiency. It reflects that bigger institutions were relatively more efficient. The evidence, 
that borrowed fund from international financial institution negatively (insignificantly) affect cost 
 29 
efficiency of banks, proves opinion that was discussed earlier. Negative and significant 
correlation of deposit to asset ratio indicates that accumulation of deposits relative to assets 
negatively affects banks cost efficiency. 
As we can see from Table 8, foreign strategic ownership and international financial 
institutions involvement causes more efficient operation of banks relative to foreign majority 
ownership. Moreover, foreign majority ownership negatively affects banks cost efficiency.  
It can be summarized from above that foreign strategic owned banks with international 
foreign institutions partner in Georgia outperformed their domestic counterparts and their active 
involvement improved the efficiency of banks in the Georgian banking sector. On the contrary, 
foreign majority ownership decreases the cost efficiency of the banks. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper introduces the Georgian banking sector and its experience and development 
during the country’s move form centralized economy to a market-oriented system.  Foreign 
participation in the Georgian banking sector has increased starting from1999; the empirical 
findings suggest that such foreign ownership have a positive effect on the banks’ performance. To 
observe this issue empirically, the study takes a sample of banks from the Georgian banking 
system and focuses, first, on the bank’s financial performance measures, using ROA and ROE, 
and, second, on the banks’ efficiency scores, using a stochastic frontier analysis for cost function.  
When investigating the ownership type’s effect on the banks’ financial performance, the study 
concludes that foreign strategic ownership and foreign majority ownership affect the banks’ 
financial measurements – ROA and ROE, both differently and significantly. Applying the return 
on equity model estimation, the paper concludes that foreign majority ownership positively 
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affects the banks’ financial performance, ROA. However, it renders a negative effect on ROE. 
Taking into account the fact that some banks under foreign strategic ownership did not change 
their activities after they have been purchased, the overall effect of foreign strategic ownership is 
negative. The fact, that international financial institutions require the banks to allocate cheap 
sources to inefficient economic sectors (such as agriculture) causes a negative, but insignificant, 
correlation with the banks’ financial performance (ROA and ROE). 
Applying stochastic frontier analysis renders interesting results: banks with strategic 
ownership or international financial institutions involvement (EBRD and IFC) are found to be 
more efficient than their domestic counterparts. However, banks with foreign majority ownership 
are significantly less cost efficient than those with foreign strategic ownership, international 
financial institutions involvement and domestic banks. The paper also concludes that the funds 
borrowed from international financial institutions have a negative impact on the cost-efficiency of 
the banks. 
Observing the existing data, the study found that banks with foreign majority ownership 
collect more deposits and make more loans than domestic banks and those with foreign strategic 
ownership. Also, the banks with foreign majority ownership have the smallest provision of 
doubtful loans to gross loan ration and non-interest expenditure to asset. After adjusting for size, 
the study found that domestic banks are collecting more deposits and make more loans than the 
banks with foreign strategic ownership. One can argue that, because foreign banks have lower 
interest margin than domestic banks, domestic banks will also decrease their interest margins 
under increasing competition. This conclusion, however, is left for another study to elaborate on. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2 Banks Foreign Shareholders  Share in capital  
Foreigners 
total share 
in capital 
1 BANK OF GEORGIA 
Bank New of York  (Nominees) Limited23 66.2%  
90.73% 
Firebird Avrora Fund 5.8% 
Firebird Republics Fund 5.7% 
East Capital Financial Institutions II AB 5.4% 
Others 7.63% 
2 TBC BANK 
International Financial Corporation (IFC) 30.95% 
69.41% Liquid Cristal International 20.10% 
Deutshe Investitions and Entwicklungesellschaft 
mbH (German) 18.36% 
3 Bank REPUBLIC Societe Generale (France) 60% 70% EBRD 10% 
4 VTB BANK – (GEORGIA) Vneshtorgbank (Russia) 51% 87.13% Others 36.13% 
5 PROCREDIT BANK 
ProCredit Holding AG (Germany)   91.42% 
100% Internationale Projekt Consult (IPC) GmbH (Germany)     7.35%   
Commerzbank (Germany) 1.23% 
6 BANK CARTU - - 0% 
7 
PEOPLE’S BANK OF 
GEORGIA - - 0% 
8 STANDARD BANK Financial Investment Management company 25% 25% 
9 BASISBANK - - 0% 
10 TAOPRIVATBANK PrivateBank (Ukraine) 75% 98.78% Zurifin AG (Switzerland) 23.78% 
11 BTA SILK ROAD BANK Bank TuranAlem (Kazakistan) 49% 76.01% Other 27.01% 
12 AGROINVESTBANK - - 0% 
13 FIRST BRITISH BANK  MonteCristo Capital LTD (England) 67% 67% 
14 INVESTBANK 
Seton Enterprises (England) 25% 
100% Comet Investments (US) 25% Galbon Sarl (Sweden) 18% 
London International Bank (England) 32% 
15 HSBC BANK-GEORGIA HSBC Europe 70% 100% Vingz establishment 30% 
16 PROGRESS BANK - - 0% 
17 Kor Bank Georgia - - 0% 
18 Galt & Taggart Bank JSC - - 0% 
19 JSC Halyk Bank Georgia - - - 
20 
BANK A.S. (Head office – 
Ankara, Turkey), TBILISI 
BRANCH 
- - - 
21 International Bank of Azerbaijan - Georgia JSC 
International Bank of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) 75% 100% 
CI Bank (Azerbaidjan) 25% 
22 
OPEN JSC 
TRANSCAUCASUS 
DEVELOPMENT BANK 
TBILISI BRANCH 
- - - 
 
 
                                                 
23 . Bank New of York  (Nominees) Limited owes the stocks which are traded in London stock exchange, so it cannot 
influence on strategic decisions of Bank of Georgia (BOG) 
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Table 3 
Foreign majority owner Domestic 
International 
financing 
institutions Foreign owner  
Republic bank Bank of Georgia Cartu Bank Republic Bank 
VTB Bank BTA Silk Road Bank Peoples Bank TBC Bank 
Procredit Bank Investbank standard bank   
TaoPrivateBank   TBC Bank Basisbank   
First British Bank   Agroinvestbank   
Two Branches       
